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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Deficits in Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorders When Processing
Multiple Objects in Dynamic Scenes
Kirsten O’Hearn, Laura Lakusta, Elizabeth Schroer, Nancy Minshew, and Beatriz Luna
People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) process visual information in a manner that is distinct from typically
developing individuals. They may be less sensitive to people’s goals and, more generally, focus on visual details instead of
the entire scene. To examine these differences, people with and without ASD were asked to detect changes in dynamic
scenes with multiple elements. Participants viewed a brief video of a person or an inanimate object (the ‘‘figure’’) moving
from one object to another; after a delay, they reported whether a second video was the same or different. Possible
changes included the figure, the object the figure was moving from, or the object the figure was moving toward (the
‘‘goal’’). We hypothesized that individuals with ASD would be less sensitive to changes in scenes with people, particularly
elements that might be the person’s goal. Alternately, people with ASD might attend to fewer elements regardless of
whether the scene included a person. Our results indicate that, like controls, people with ASD noticed a change in the
‘‘goal’’ object at the end of a person’s movement more often than the object at the start. However, the group with ASD
did not undergo the developmental improvement that was evident typically when detecting changes in both the start
and end objects. This atypical development led to deficits in adults with ASD that were not specific to scenes with people
or to ‘‘goals.’’ Improvements in visual processing that underlie mature representation of scenes may not occur in ASD,
suggesting that late developing brain processes are affected. Autism Res 2011, 4: 132–142. & 2011 International Society
for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Keywords: ASD; change detection; development; developmental disorder; people perception; social cognition

As people interact with the environment, they visually
process an array of distinct objects. To behave effectively,
they must recognize these objects and understand their
relationship to each other and the surroundings. The
ability to attend to all the important (i.e., meaningful)
aspects of a visual scene, and understand their significance, requires complex visual processing that may differ
in neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Individuals with ASD have a
unique pattern of visual processing. They tend to focus
on individual elements, possibly undermining their
ability to process global configuration [Behrmann et al.,
2006; Brosnan, Scott, Fox, & Pye, 2004; Dakin & Frith,
2005; Jemel, Mottron, & Dawson, 2006; Scherf, Luna,
Kimchi, Minshew, & Behrmann, 2008]. Several theories
have attempted to characterize this tendency, including
Weak Central Coherence (WCC) [Frith & Happe, 1994;
Happe, 1999] and Enhanced Perceptual Functioning
[Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006].
Both theories highlight a local bias in visual processing,
leading to superior performance on some tasks [i.e.,
embedded figures task, visual search; O’Riordan &
Plaisted, 2001; Shah & Frith, 1983]. WCC integrates the
local bias with a deficit in processing global configuration

in ASD, potentially contributing to deficits on important
visual tasks, such as face processing [Behrmann et al.,
2006; Deruelle, Rondan, Salle-Collemiche, BastardRosset, & Da Fonseca, 2008; Jemel et al., 2006]. WCC
predicts that there would be limitations when visually
processing complex scenes and objects in ASD, and these
differences are sometimes evident [Jolliffe & BaronCohen, 2001; Nakahachi et al., 2008].
Data from change detection paradigms also indicate that
there are differences in how individuals with ASD ‘‘see’’
complex naturalistic scenes. Change detection paradigms
can assess sensitivity to different elements within a scene;
changes to more ‘‘central’’ or ‘‘meaningful’’ elements may
be detected faster or more accurately than other changes
[Rensink, 2002; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001]. A limitation of
change detection paradigms is that it is difficult to identify
at what level of processing a change is detected (e.g.,
percept, attended information, or matching). However,
Rensink and colleagues argue that focused attention may
be the dominant factor, and is necessary (though not
sufficient) to detect a change [Rensink, 2002; Simons &
Rensink, 2005]. These investigators also discuss the
importance of attentional management—in other words,
using attention in a way that is sensitive to the task at hand
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and utilizes high-level knowledge (including semantic
knowledge and the overall visual layout of the scene).
There is some evidence that such processes differ in ASD.
Adults with ASD were impaired at detecting changes in
objects that were semantically marginal in the scene, but
not those that were central, compared to typical adults
[Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Turner, & Moxon, 2006]. Adults
with ASD were also less likely to detect changes to objects
that were ‘‘out of place’’ in a scene [e.g., a briefcase
changing to a toaster in an office; Loth, Gómez, & Happé,
2008]. These findings suggest that the focus on individual
element(s) in ASD may affect their ability to integrate
elements together into a coherent representation of a
complex scene. In contrast, a study of adolescents with
ASD indicated that they were more sensitive to changes
than typically developing individuals, presumably due to
their strong visual search abilities [Smith & Milne, 2009].
This evidence suggests that there are differences in how
individuals with and without ASD view all complex
scenes, including those without people. However, another view suggests that these differences would be more
evident in scenes with people, reflecting impairments in
interpreting people’s behavior and intentions/goals, and
possibly contributing to the social deficits that are a core
feature of ASD [Sasson, 2006]. A person’s intention or
goal is often evident from their direction of movement
and gaze—people generally move toward and look at
their goals. Individuals with ASD are sensitive to gaze
direction [Falck-Ytter, 2010; Fletcher-Watson, Leekam,
Findlay, & Stanton, 2008; Freeth, Ropar, Chapman, &
Mitchell, 2010; Rutherford & Krysko, 2008], but there are
subtle differences in this ability [de Jong, van Engeland,
& Kemner, 2008; Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson,
Frank, & Findlay, 2008; Freeth, Chapman, Ropar, &
Mitchell, 2010; Wallace, Coleman, Pascalis, & Bailey,
2006], along with distinct patterns of brain function in
ASD [Dichter & Belger, 2007; Pelphrey, Morris, &
McCarthy, 2005]. For instance, recent work indicates
that, while adults with ASD looked at the people in
scenes as much as controls, they were less likely to look at
what that person was gazing at—the likely goal of that
person’s thoughts or actions [Fletcher-Watson, Leekam,
Benson et al., 2008; Freeth, Chapman et al., 2010]. These
differences in interpreting gaze may contribute to the
joint attention deficits in ASD [Leekam, Baron-Cohen,
Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997; Leekam, Lopez, &
Moore, 2000; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman,
1986]. Finally, individuals with ASD may be less likely
to interpret some actions as intentional [Campbell et al.,
2006; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; Rutherford,
Pennington, & Rogers, 2006; for reviews, see Pelphrey,
Adolphs, & Morris, 2004; Tuchman, 2003]. So, while
people with ASD are generally more able to process
mental state information than originally hypothesized
[Perner & Leekam, 2008; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan,
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1994], a lack of sensitivity to gaze and other social
information may lead to decreased attention to people’s
intentions and their goals.
Therefore, an important question is whether limitations
in interpreting scenes in ASD reflect a lack of sensitivity to
people and their behavior/goals, or the general visual
pattern of a greater focus on individual elements than on
global configuration. This general visual pattern could
also undermine comprehension of complex social scenes,
for instance by decreasing sensitivity to the relationships
between elements (e.g., people and their goals). To
examine these possibilities, the current study investigated
whether individuals in ASD were less sensitive to changes
in scenes with people, or whether the pattern of
performance in ASD was similar in scenes with and
without people. The former result would be consistent
with theories positing that visual differences in ASD
mainly reflect difficulties in interpreting human behavior;
the latter would support theories positing that more
general visual differences in ASD affect the ability to
interpret visual stimuli including people. The task focused
on specific aspects of visual processing thought to be
affected in ASD, including the use of movement and gaze
to highlight potentially important elements (i.e., goals),
and attention to non-central (i.e., marginal) components
of a scene. A change detection task with dynamic video
clips was used. Dynamic videos were chosen because (1)
previous work has shown striking inability to detect
changes in video clips typically [Simons, Franconeri, &
Reimer, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005], (2) differences in
ASD in eye movements may be particularly evident in
dynamic scenes [Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007],
and (3) dynamic scenes are more naturalistic and allow
movement cues to goals. Based on evidence that ASD
affects sensitivity to goals [as suggested by eye gaze;
Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson et al., 2008; Freeth,
Chapman et al., 2010; Pierno, Mari, Glover, Georgiou, &
Castiello, 2006], we predicted that group differences
would be more notable in the scenes that involved people
than those without. In particular, we thought that the
group with ASD would be less likely to detect changes in
the object being gazed at. However, if the differences in
ASD on this task reflect more general visual tendencies,
group differences would be similar across conditions.

Methods
Participants
Participants included 37 people with ASD and 37 typically
developing people matched individually to the participants
with ASD on age (1.5 years for children, 3 years for adults)
and IQ (15 points; see Table 1). Individuals with ASD were
recruited through the University of Pittsburgh Autism
Center of Excellence (ACE) Subject Core (HD] 055748)
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Table 1.

Demographics
Children

Adolescents

ASD
Variable
n
Age
Full scale IQ
Verbal IQ
Performance IQ
ADOS social
ADOS comm
ADOS total

Control

M

SD

8
11
100.25
104.25
96
9.63
4.75
14.38

1.07
6.69
13.25
6.21
1.6
1.58
2.88

ASD

M

SD

8
11.13
105.63
104.5
105.38

0.835
9.74
9.26
10.72

Control

M

SD

15
15.2
105.87
104.87
105.07
9.13
4.6
13.73

1.7
13.15
12.28
14.45
2.1
0.99
2.43

and were originally identified via announcements at parent
meetings and autism group newsletters. Participants were
diagnosed with ASD using the structured research diagnostic
instruments, namely the Autism Diagnostic Interview [ADI;
Lord, Rutter, & Couteur, 1994] and Autism Diagnostic
Observation Schedule-G [ADOS; Lord, Rutter, & Goode,
1989], with the DSM-IV scoring algorithm [American
Psychiatric Association, 2000]. Individuals with PDD-NOS
were excluded, as were those with full-scale IQs o80 on the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence [WASI; Wechsler,
1999]. The diagnosis was also confirmed by expert assessment using the established clinical description of highfunctioning autism [Minshew, 1996]. There was no known
basis, for instance a genetic or infectious etiology, for the
disorder. Typically developing participants were recruited
through the ACE Subject Core and other ongoing projects
in the laboratory. Participants were generally healthy, and
had no history of head trauma, birth complications,
seizures, or psychiatric disorders. Informed consent and
assent was obtained from all participants or their legal
guardians prior to the study, which was approved by the
Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh.
Both children and adults with ASD were tested. While
little is known about how visual processing of dynamic
scenes develops, recent work suggests that change detection improves with age typically [Fletcher-Watson, Collis,
Findlay, & Leekam, 2009; Shore, Burack, Miller, Joseph, &
Enns, 2006]. Developmental changes may differ in ASD;
Burack et al. found that while performance was comparable across groups, detection became more rapid and
accurate with developmental level (as measured by a
matrices task) in the typical children but not in those with
ASD [Burack et al., 2009]. Thus, age (children/adolescents,
adults) was included as a between-subjects factor in the
initial omnibus analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Stimuli
Stimuli were short video clips with a person or an object
moving from one object (the Start object) to another (the
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Adults
ASD

M

SD

15
15.07
106.07
105.33
106.2

1.83
7.44
8.47
7.87

Control

M

SD

14
22.14
105.86
105
105.29
9
5.07
14.07

4.15
12.05
10.14
13.73
2.25
1.21
3.17

M

SD

14
22
105.43
103.5
105.93

4.51
10.63
10.35
11.47

End object; Fig. 1). There were three conditions (Look
forward, Look back, and Physical). The stimuli in the
Look forward and Look back conditions were scenes with
people while the Physical condition included only
inanimate objects. The comparison of Look forward and
Look back allowed us to examine whether participants
used the direction of eye gaze to highlight ‘‘goal’’ objects,
and how information about the Figure’s gaze interacted
with information from the Figure’s movement. The order
of conditions was counterbalanced, and the counterbalanced conditions were matched across groups.
Look forward condition. Participants were shown 37
videotaped motion events where the Figure (a person)
moved from the Start object to the End object (the ‘‘goal’’).
The Figure looked at the End object that they were moving
toward, making it likely that the End object was construed
as the goal of the movement. All components in the event
remained on the screen throughout the event. The Start
and End objects were real objects, such as a table or chair.
Left–right location of the Start and End objects were
counterbalanced over events, as was the direction that the
actor moved. After the delay, participants saw a second
video event that ‘‘matched’’ the initial video in all or most
ways. The matched event was either the same video as in
the target event (No change; N 5 9); or had a different Start
object (N 5 9), a different End object (N 5 9), or a different
Figure (N 5 5). On some trials (N 5 5), there was a change
in motion (such as jumping or hopping); these filler trials
were included to increase the difficulty of the task and to
avoid participants adopting a strategy of attending only to
the Figure, and the Start and End objects. Changes in the
Start and End objects were equated, in that the same set of
changes (e.g., a TV to a cart) was used for both cases. This
manipulation allowed us to examine the hypothesis that
noticing changes in the End object, presumably the
person’s goal, would be more difficult for those with ASD.
Look back condition. These videos used the same
background, objects, and Figures as the Look forward
condition except that, while the Figure was still moving
from the Start object to the End object, they were looking
back at the Start object instead of looking forward to the
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Figure 1. (A) Video stills from the three conditions and the elements that could change in ‘‘different’’ trials (Start object, Figure,
Motion, and End object), (B) Trial design.
End object. This condition dissociated the direction of gaze
from the direction of movement, providing conflicting cues
about the person’s goal. This manipulation enabled us to
examine whether the two groups weighted movement and
gaze cues similarly, and whether differences between groups
reflected gaze direction per se, since the perception and
interpretation of gaze are commonly reported deficits in
ASD [Pelphrey et al., 2005].
Physical condition. These 32 motion events included
an inanimate object (the Figure) being rolled (N 5 16) or
blown (N 5 16) from a Start object to an End object. Start
and End objects were real objects, such as a cup or folder.
The moving Figures were objects that could be easily
blown (e.g., tissue, leaf) or rolled (e.g., pen, battery) by an
external force (e.g., a hairdryer positioned off screen).
Similar to the other conditions, each of the 32 events had
a ‘‘matched’’ event that was either the same video as the
target event (No change; N 5 8); or had a different Start
object (N 5 8), End object (N 5 8), or moving Figure
(N 5 8). To confirm that the motion was not considered
intentional, five adults were asked to describe the events
and their descriptions were coded for mentalistic language
[Heider & Simmel, 1944]. Mentalistic language was not
used, confirming that these events were not considered
animate by typical adults. This condition allowed us to
examine whether the pattern of performance in the other
conditions was specific to ‘‘intentional’’ events with
people, or generalized to events with an inanimate
Figure that was not construed as intentional.
Procedure
The method utilized a change blindness paradigm,
expanding on evidence that people fail to notice all the
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information in a visual scene [Simons & Levin, 1997;
Simons & Rensink, 2005]. Individuals saw two videos and
had to decide if the videos were the same or different. In
each trial (Fig. 1), participants viewed a video of a
dynamic event for 2.5 sec, a black screen for 10 sec, and
a second event for 2.5 sec, after which they judged
whether the two videos were the same or different. The
participant responded verbally and the experimenter
circled same or different for each response. We also asked
participants what had changed and recorded these
answers. However, careful inspection of these answers
did not yield any informative data because many people
did not answer these questions, or had a difficult time
reporting exactly what changed (e.g., item on the left
instead of the actual object), consistent with previous
work showing that changes are often detected before they
can be accurately identified [Rensink, 2002]. Thus, we
were unable to analyze the actual answers.
We wanted to ensure that participants utilized visual
processes and did not rely on encoding the information
linguistically. For example, participants might verbally
represent all the objects in a scene by repeating ‘‘the man
went from the desk to the ladder.’’ If participants used
this verbal strategy, even if they did not visually notice a
change in the second video, they could go through each
item (verbally encoded from the first video, i.e., ‘‘man,
desk, ladder’’) to examine whether it was in the second
video, thus detecting the change without using a visual
representation. To ensure that participants did not use
this sort of verbal strategy, participants were required to
verbally shadow a sequence of numbers and words during
the video clips. Such verbal output—repeating words out
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loud—makes it difficult to remember the items by
repeating them verbally [see also Hermer-Vazquez,
Spelke, & Katsnelson, 2008]. We also asked trivia questions during the 10-sec delay. Pilot data suggested that
this manipulation, along with the delay, was necessary to
prevent typical adults from performing at ceiling. It also
ensured there was no verbal encoding during the delay.
Spatial span. Since the change detection paradigm
has a significant working memory component,
participants also did the spatial span to assess working
memory. We administered the spatial span from the
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery
(CANTAB) via a desktop touch-screen computer
(Mitsubishi Precise Point 8705). In this task, an array of
white squares in a random pattern is presented. Some of
the squares briefly change color and then return to white;
participants are instructed to remember the location and
the sequence of the squares that change color.
Immediately after the final square returns to white,
participants touch the squares that changed color in
the exact sequence that they remember the changes
having occurred. The number of squares to be
remembered progressively increases from two to nine.
Participants must perform one of the three trials correctly
to progress to the next level of difficulty, which requires
remembering one more square. Previous studies indicate
that people with ASD perform more poorly than controls
on this task [Luna et al., 2002; Luna, Doll, Hegedus,
Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007; Williams, Goldstein, &
Minshew, 2005]. Thus, the inclusion of this measure as
a covariate helps to control for general differences in
working memory between groups in the analyses. This
task was generally administered after the experiment.
Analyses. Since two of the trial type/condition
combinations (i.e., Figure change, Look forward; No
change, Physical) exhibited substantial negative skew in
the distribution of the proportion of correct responses, the
proportion correct data were transformed using a natural
log on the reflected data [Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller,
1988; also thanks to Dr. Richard Lowry’s very
informative website at http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry].
This transformed ‘‘proportion of correct responses’’ was
more normally distributed and was used as the dependent
variable.1 The primary analyses used repeated measures
ANOVAs. Since there was a trend for Age (Children,
Adults) to interact with Group in this initial ANOVA, the
sample was split into separate groups for further analyses
using repeated measures ANOVAS. After these ANOVAs,
planned comparisons examined group differences in each
trial and condition separately, to test our hypotheses that
scenes with people—and, more specifically, the objects of
people’s gaze and actions—might be represented
differently in individuals with ASD. Finally, ANOVAs

1

Signal detection analysis, taking into account the number of hits and
false alarms, was not performed on these data because the no change trials
(‘‘false alarms’’) were the same for all types of change trials.
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were used to examine developmental change separately
in the typically developing group and the group with ASD.
While signal detection analysis could not be performed
on this data (see footnote 1), the fact that performance
was similar across groups on the no change trials suggests
that all groups mistakenly identified a change when there
was not one at similar levels. That this mistake occurred
relatively often is interesting. A limitation of this current
study is that we cannot be sure whether participants were
correct about what changed when there was a change, or
what they thought changed when they reported a change
in the no change condition. Further work is needed to
address these issues.

Results
Preliminary Analysis
Spatial span was significantly lower in individuals with ASD
than in typically developing individuals (t[72] 5 3.28,
P 5 0.002) consistent with previous studies [Steele, Minshew,
Luna, & Sweeney, 2007; Williams et al., 2005]. Thus, in
the ANOVAs described below, spatial span scores were
used as a covariate to minimize the influence of working
memory on the results.2 Although well-matched on IQ,
we also co-varied for full-scale IQ in the primary analyses.
Primary Analyses
Omnibus ANOVA. To examine the effects of group on
performance in the change detection task, a repeated
measures ANOVA was used. Group (2 levels; Control,
ASD) and Age (2 levels; Children/adolescents, Adults)
were between-subject factors. Condition (three levels:
Look forward, Look back, and Inanimate) and, nested
within Condition, Trial type (four levels: No change,
Source change, Goal change, and Figure change) were
within-subject factors. Both spatial span and full-scale IQ
were included as covariates. The Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected F values are reported, to correct for some
violations of sphericity. This initial, omnibus ANOVA
indicated a main effect of Condition (F(1.99, 135.42) 5
4.18, P 5 0.02), Group (F(1, 68) 5 4.84, P 5 0.03), and a
trend for Age (F(1, 68) 5 3.61, P 5 0.06). Importantly,
these effects were mitigated by a borderline interaction
between Group and Age (F(1, 68) 5 3.17, P 5 0.08),
suggesting that the divergence in performance between
groups differed in children/adolescents and adults.
No other factors were significant. Therefore, to better
understand group differences, the two age groups were
analyzed separately using repeated measures ANOVAs
with the between-group factor of Group, within-group
factors of Condition and, nested, Trial Type, with spatial
span and IQ as covariates. When age in years was used as
2
Two subjects with ASD did not take the Spatial Span task due to
experiment malfunction; thus, these individuals are not included in the
ANOVA. However, the pattern was similar when all participants were
included, and spatial span was not a covariate.
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a covariate, there was a trend for a main effect of Group
(F(1, 69) 5 3.59, P 5 06) but none of the interactions
reached significance. This lack of significance probably
reflects, in part, that Age does not affect performance on
this task in a linear, continuous manner, especially since
this sample contains a substantial number of adults. A
larger sample is needed to identify the true
developmental trajectory, both typically and in ASD.
ANOVA—children/adolescents 9–18 years old
(N 5 23 per group). There were no significant main
effects or interactions between Group, Condition, and Trial
Type, including no main effect of Group (F[1, 42] 5 .08,
P 5 0.78). Exploratory analyses indicated that this pattern
remained the same when the children (9 to 12; N 5 8) and
the adolescents (13 to 17; N 5 15) were analyzed separately
(Group effect, Children F(1, 12) 5 0.001, P 5 0.97;
Adolescents F(1, 26) 5 1.0, P 5 0.33), though caution is
stressed due to the small sample size of the child group
(Fig. 2). Since there was such a large age range, we also
performed an ANOVA with age as a covariate. This analysis
also failed to identify a main effect of Group (F(1, 41) 5 0.73,
P 5 0.40) or any interactions with Group, though there was a
main effect of Age (F(1, 41) 5 5.07, P 5 0.03) on performance.
ANOVA—adults (N 5 14 per group). A main effect of
group indicated that adults with ASD performed more
poorly than typically developing adults (Group:
F[1, 24] 5 9.05, P 5 0.006). There was a borderline main
effect of Condition (F[2, 43.52] 5 3.31, P 5 0.05), reflecting that performance was slightly better in Condition 2
(Look Back) than in 1 (Look Forward) or 3 (Physical)
but post-hoc comparisons did not reveal significant
differences between conditions (all Ps40.18). There
was also an interaction between Group and Trial Type
(F[2.36, 56.53] 5 3.19, P 5 0.04), indicating that group
differences were more evident on some Trial Types than
on others. The same pattern was evident when Age was
used as a covariate (main effect of Group: F(1, 23) 5 9.06,

P 5 0.006; Group  Trial interaction F(2.35, 53.98) 5 3.14,
Po0.05). No other main effects or interactions reached
significance. We tested our hypothesis—that individuals
with ASD would be less sensitive to changes in potential
goals—using planned comparisons, specifically t-tests to
examine group differences on each trial type/condition
combination separately. These analyses revealed that,
regardless of condition, the group with ASD tended to
perform more poorly than controls on the Start object
change trials (Look forward condition, t[19.9] 5 1.98,
P 5 0.06; Look back condition, t[21.40] 5 2.37, P 5 0.03;
Physical condition, t[24.92] 5 3.12, P 5 0.005) and the
End object changes trials (Look forward condition,
t[21.19] 5 2.30, P 5 0.03; Look back condition, t[14.86] 5
4.84, Po0.001; Physical condition, t[21.64] 5 2.09,
Po0.05). There was also a trend for a significant
difference on the figure change trials in the Look back
condition (t[24.86] 5 1.99, P 5 0.06) (Fig. 3).
ANOVA–development. To examine the developmental
profile in the groups (TD and ASD) separately, we analyzed
performance in each group using an ANOVA with
Condition and Trial Type as within-subject factors and Age
(children/adolescents, adults) as a between-subject factor. In
typically developing individuals, this analysis revealed a
main effect of Age (F(1, 35) 5 6.76, P 5 0.014), and
borderline interaction between Age and Trial Type (F(1.98,
69.55) 5 2.91, P 5 0.06). Age did not interact with any other
variables. Post-hoc comparisons using independent t-tests
(equal variances not assumed) examined this interaction
further. Improvements in typical development between
childhood and adulthood tended to occur on the Start and
End object change trials (though not in the End object trials
in the Physical condition). Performance improved with age
on the Start and End object trials in the Look forward
condition (t(34.9) 5 2.67, P 5 0.01; t(34.91) 5 2.89,
P 5 0.007) and the Look back condition (t(34.9) 5 2.07,
P 5 0.05; t(25.52) 5 3.24, P 5 0.003), as well as the Start
object trials in the Physical condition (t(33.17) 5 2.54,
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P 5 0.02). In the group with ASD, Age did not have a main
effect nor did it interact with Condition or Trial (all
Ps40.47). The pattern was the same when spatial span
and full-scale IQ were used as covariates in each ANOVA.
Thus, typically developing individuals improved with age,
but individuals with ASD did not, on five of the six trial
types that showed a significant difference between the ASD
and TD groups in adulthood.
Object of gaze. To explore how gaze and movement cues
affected change detection in individuals with ASD, and
whether they weighted the gaze and movement cues
similarly to typically developing people, we analyzed a
composite score that compared change detection
performance for Start and End objects. If movement is a
stronger cue to what to look at than gaze, people should
detect changes in End objects better than Start objects for
both event types (Look Forward and Look Back); if gaze is a
stronger cue, than this ‘‘goal bias’’ pattern would be evident
in the Look forward but not the Look back condition. To
examine these potential patterns, we computed a difference
score on the accuracy (End object–Start object). To examine
whether there were differences across Group or Age on this
variable, we first did an ANOVA on this difference score with
Condition as a within-subject factor, Group and Age as a
between-subjects factor, and spatial span/full-scale IQ as
covariates. While this analysis revealed a main effect of
Condition (F(1.97, 133.96) 5 7.01, P 5 0.001), there were no
main effects or interactions with Group or Age (all
Ps40.28). To examine the Condition effect further, one
sample t-tests were used to identify whether the difference
score was significantly higher than zero. Changes in End
objects were detected better than Start objects in both the
Look forward and Look back conditions (control group,
Look forward t[36] 5 4.09, Po0.001, Look back t[36] 5 3.77,
P 5 0.001; ASD group, Look forward t[36] 5 2.74, P 5 0.01],
Look back t[36] 5 2.23, P 5 0.03]), but not in the Physical
condition, with an inanimate object as the Figure (control
group t[36] 5 0.58, P 5 0.57; ASD group t[36] 5 0.24,
P 5 0.81). Thus, overall, both groups were more likely to
detect changes in the End object than the Start object when
the Figure was a person, presumably because the intentional
movement toward the End object was a strong indicator
that this object was important. That this uneven pattern of
performance also occurred in the Look back condition,
when Figures were looking at the Start object, indicates that
movement was a stronger cue than gaze as to which object
was important in these videos. That this pattern did not
occur in the Physical condition suggests that neither group
viewed the End object of the inanimate Figure’s movement
as particularly important. In addition, it indicates that the
better accuracy for the End object in the Look Forward and
Look Back conditions was not simply a recency effect—if so,
it should have occurred in all conditions.
Improvement across a condition.3 One possibility is
that participants may have learned what objects were

3

We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
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likely to change, ‘‘priming’’ them to attend to these
objects. To examine this possibility, we divided our data
into the first third and last third of each condition; this
analysis is exploratory, because each of these ‘‘thirds’’
contained between two and five trials of each trial type.
We analyzed the data with Condition, Trial Type and
Timing (first 1/3, last 1/3) as within-subject factors, and
Group (ASD, controls) and Age (children/adolescents,
adults) as between-subject factors. Timing had a
significant main effect (F(1, 70) 5 93.00, Po0.001), but
it did not interact with Group, Age, or Group  Age (all
P’s40.42), indicating that this effect was similar across
groups. Timing did interact with both Condition (F(1.86,
126.27) 5 50.19, Po0.001), and Trial type (F(2.35,
165.11) 5 70.74, Po0.001); these affects are mitigated
by a significant three-way interaction between Timing,
Condition and Trial type (F(1.96, 291.05) 5 28.95,
Po0.001). No other interactions were significant.
We then examined this three-way interaction using
paired t-tests comparing performance on the first and last
third of the trials in each condition/trial type combination. This analysis was carried out across the entire group,
since the ANOVA indicated that timing affected different
groups and ages similarly. We found that individuals
tended to perform similarly across the first third and the
last third of the no change trials (Look forward
t(73) 5 1.34, P 5 0.18; Physical t(73) 5 0.33, P 5 0.75)
with the exception of the difficult Look back condition
(t(73) 5 7.42, Po0.001). Participants grew better at
detecting a Figure change when the Figure was a person
(Look forward; t(73) 5 9.27, Po0.001; Look back;
t(73) 5 17.97, Po0.001) but not when the Figure was
an inanimate object (t(73) 5 0.43, P 5 0.67). Participants grew better at detecting an End object change—
what the figure was moving toward—when the person
was looking at the End object (t(73) 5 4.14, Po0.001)
but grew significantly worse when the person was
looking at the Start object or the Figure was inanimate
(Look back; t(73) 5 7.51, Po0.001: Physical; t(73) 5 2.87,
P 5 0.005). They also became better at detecting Start
object changes when the person was looking at the Start
object (t(73) 5 6.55, Po0.001), grew worse when the
Figure was inanimate (t(73) 5 3.24, P 5 0.002), and did
not change significantly when the Figure was looking
forward at the End object (t(73) 5 1.82, P 5 0.07). This
analysis indicates that—as a condition went on—participants became more sensitive to people (as the Figure) and
the object of their gaze, sometimes to the detriment of
the other potential changes. Interestingly, this increasing
sensitivity to people and the objects of their gaze
(perhaps as participants noted the direction of gaze
across a condition, as suggested by the reviewer) was
similar across group and age.
Summary of the results. These results indicate that
adults with ASD had difficulty encoding the Start and End
objects in all conditions, regardless of whether the
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condition included people (Look forward, Look back) or
not (Physical). Adults with ASD are less sensitive to
changes in these peripheral objects; the similarity across
condition indicates that this difference does not reflect
decreased sensitivity to human ‘‘goals’’ or intentions. This
group difference was not evident between the children/
adolescents with and without ASD. This result suggests
there are typical developmental improvements when
representing peripheral but still important objects (the
Start and End objects) through adolescence, but that these
improvements do not occur in ASD. This possibility was
supported by our developmental analyses in each group
separately, which showed significant development on
these types of change trials in controls but not in ASD.
The exception was End object changes in the Physical
condition: adults with ASD performed more poorly than
control adults on this trial type/condition combination,
but there was not significant typical development. There
was also a trend for adults with ASD to perform more
poorly than typical adults at detecting Figure changes in
the Look back condition. This insensitivity to a change in
a moving person may reflect that this condition had
conflicting cues (looking one way, moving another) that
added complexity to the task, potentially making it more
difficult for adults with ASD to represent all the potentially
important objects. In addition to the group differences,
these results also revealed some similarities between the
groups with and without ASD. Both groups were more
likely to attend to the End object than to the Start object
in the people conditions (Look forward and Look back
conditions), regardless of whether the person was looking
at the Start or End object, but not in the Physical
condition. This result indicates that both groups were
more likely to use the ‘‘moving toward’’ cue, compared to
the ‘‘looking at’’ cue, to allocate their attention.

Conclusions and Discussion
These findings indicate that adults with ASD have more
difficulty than typical adults at detecting changes in all the
potentially relevant objects in a scene: in particular,
peripheral objects that the figure is moving to and from.
The three conditions allowed us to examine whether the
differences in ASD were specific to scenes with people or,
even more precisely, the objects of people’s gaze. In
contrast to our hypothesis, adults with ASD performed
more poorly than typical adults when detecting changes
in the object at the beginning and the end of a movement,
regardless of whether the moving object was a person or
an inanimate object. Therefore, differences in adults with
ASD in this paradigm are more likely to reflect their
general visual profile [Dakin & Frith, 2005; Mottron et al.,
2006] than difficulty in interpreting people’s goals or
actions. This impairment is consistent with recent evidence indicating that detection of the changes in marginal
objects was impaired in adults with ASD, while detection
of the central changes in a scene was similar to typical
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adults [Fletcher-Watson et al., 2006]. These authors suggest
that individuals with ASD have difficulty attending to
multiple objects, particularly when there is an engaging
central figure, as in the current study. Decreased sensitivity
to peripheral objects may impact the ability to interpret
mental states, as understanding a person’s goals often
requires attending to peripheral and/or multiple objects
(e.g., the object being gazed at; relations between objects).
No differences were found between children/adolescents with ASD and typically developing children,
suggesting that the difficulties observed for adults with
ASD may be attributed to ‘‘atypical’’ development.
Specifically, in typical development, the ability to detect
changes in the important but peripheral objects that a
moving figure goes from and to generally tended to
improve with age. There was no developmental improvement in detecting any type of change in the group with
ASD, leading to impairments in detecting changes in the
peripheral objects by adulthood. In addition, adults with
ASD tended to perform more poorly than typical adults at
identifying a change in the moving person when a
person who was looking at one object but moving toward
another. This limitation may reflect the incongruent cues
to intentionality and what is important in the scene. In
other words, the group differences when the person
changed in this condition may reflect that attention
needs to encompass multiple objects, as participants try
to interpret the scene, and people with ASD have
difficulty with this type of ‘‘attentional management’’.
This result is consistent with prior evidence indicating
that people with autism may have particular difficulty
when gaze direction is inconsistent with their expectations [Pelphrey et al., 2005] and with more complex
stimuli [Minshew, Luna, & Sweeney, 1999].
All groups paid better attention to changes in the ‘‘goal’’
object—the object the person was moving toward—than
they did to changes in the ‘‘start object’’—the object the
person was moving from—but only when the moving
figure was a person. This result suggests that people with
ASD processed scenes with people relatively typically,
attending well to the central person and the object that
they were gazing at and/or moving toward, consistent with
recent reports on the representation of people in ASD
[Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson et al., 2008; FletcherWatson, Leekam, Findlay et al., 2008; New et al., 2010].
However, there are limitations to the present study.
Though dynamic, our scenes were relatively simple
[compared to, for instance, New et al., 2010, or the real
world]. It is possible that differences in ASD specific to
viewing people would be evident with more complex
stimuli, for instance, scenes with multiple people [Speer
et al., 2007]. In addition, there are limitations to the
change detection paradigm itself. In particular, in this
present experiment, we could not ensure that the changes
detected were indeed the correct changes. Many people
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detected changes on ‘‘no change’’ trials, and it is difficult
to know what this response reflects. Clearly, more work
needs to be done to examine whether this impairment in
adults with ASD, and the pattern of development in the
two groups, generalizes to other visual stimuli. In addition,
little is known about the typical development of the neural
substrates underlying visual processing of dynamic scenes,
so it is difficult to guess what developmental changes
might not be occurring in ASD. While speculative, we
suggest that this type of visual processing might require the
coordination of a large network of brain regions, including
temporal and frontal regions. Other work indicates that
network function has a long developmental trajectory
[Fair et al., 2009; Luna et al., 2001] and might be affected
by ASD [Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007;
Minshew & Williams, 2007].
In summary, group differences were not specific to scenes
with people, or objects of their gaze. While social deficits in
ASD might affect the interpretation of social scenes
throughout development, the currents findings do not
appear to be associated with the social impairments in
ASD per se. Instead, these findings seem to reflect less
sensitivity in ASD to changes in peripheral but still
important objects in a scene [and presumably less attention
to them; Rensink, 2002]. This difference may reflect the
distinct visual pattern, with a focus on individual elements,
described in ASD [Brosnan et al., 2004; Dakin & Frith, 2005;
Happe, 1999; Mottron et al., 2006]. This general visual
difference may impact the interpretation of complex social
scenes. Another scenario is that attention to social scenes
supports late developments in attentional management
[Rensink, 2002], leading to improvements during adolescence typically but not in ASD. That differences between
groups became evident only with age is consistent with
recent evidence indicating that late maturing visual processes are atypical in ASD, from both behavioral [Luna et al.,
2007; O’Hearn, Schroer, Minshew, & Luna, 2010; Rump,
Giovannelli, Minshew, & Strauss, 2009; Scherf et al., 2008;
Scherf, Behrmann, Kimchi, & Luna, 2009] and neuroimaging [Lee et al., 2007; Raznahan et al., 2010; Scherf, Luna,
Minshew, & Behrmann, 2010] methods. That these differences were only evident in adulthood suggests that
interventions during adolescence may be helpful for visual
differences that people with ASD find problematic. Finally,
these results indicate that age differences across samples may
contribute to the variability in the findings on visual
processing. Further study using larger sample sizes and
possibly longitudinal data will be helpful in examining the
development of the ability to represent complex, real-world
scenes in both typical and atypical populations.
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Loth, E., Gómez, C.J., & Happé, F. (2008). Detecting changes in
naturalistic scenes: Contextual inconsistency does not influence spontaneous attention in high-functioning people with
autism spectrum disorder. Autism Research, 1, 179–188.
Luna, B., Thulborn, K.R., Munoz, D.P., Merriam, E.P., Garver, K.E.,
et al. (2001). Maturation of widely distributed brain function
subserves cognitive development. NeuroImage, 13, 786–793.
Luna, B., Minshew, N.J., Garver, K.E., Lazar, N.A., Thulborn, K.R.,
et al. (2002). Neocortical system abnormalities in autism: An
fMRI study of spatial working memory. Neurology, 59,
834–840.
Luna, B., Doll, S.K., Hegedus, S.J., Minshew, N.J., & Sweeney, J.A.
(2007). Maturation of executive function in autism.
Biological Psychiatry, 61, 474–481.
Minshew, N.J. (1996). Autism. In: Berg BO, editor, Principles of
child neurology. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp 1713–1729.
Minshew, N.J., Luna, B., & Sweeney, J.A. (1999). Oculomotor
evidence for neocortical systems but not cerebellar dysfunction in autism. Neurology, 52, 917–922.
Minshew, N.J., & Williams, D.L. (2007). The new neurobiology of
autism: Cortex, connectivity, and neuronal organization.
Archives of Neurology, 64, 945–950.
Mottron, L., Dawson, M., Soulieres, I., Hubert, B., & Burack, J.
(2006). Enhanced perceptual functioning in autism: An
update, and eight principles of autistic perception. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 27–43.
Mundy, P., Sigman, M., Ungerer, J., & Sherman, T. (1986).
Defining the social deficits of autism: The contribution of
non-verbal communication measures. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 27, 657–669.
Nakahachi, T., Yamashita, K., Iwase, M., Ishiqami, W.,
Tanaka, C., et al. (2008). Disturbed holistic processing in
autism spectrum disorders verified by two cognitive tasks
requiring perception of complex visual stimuli. Psychiatry
Research, 159, 330–338.
New, J.J., Schultz, R.T., Wolf, J., Niehaus, J.L., Klin, A., et al.
(2010). The scope of social attention deficits in autism:
Prioritized orienting to people and animals in static natural
scenes. Neuropsychologia, 48, 51–59.
O’Hearn, K., Schroer, E., Minshew, N., & Luna, B. (2010). Lack of
developmental improvement on a face memory task during
adolescence in autism. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3955–3960.
O’Riordan, M., & Plaisted, K. (2001). Enhanced discrimination in
autism. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A,
54, 961–979.
Pelphrey, K., Adolphs, R., & Morris, J.P. (2004). Neuroanatomical
substrates of social cognition dysfunction in autism. Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews,
10, 259–271.
Pelphrey, K.A., Morris, J.A., & McCarthy, G. (2005). Neural basis
of eye gaze processing deficits in autism. Brain, 128,
1038–1048.

O’Hearn et al./Impaired scene detection in ASD

141

Perner, J., & Leekam, S. (2008). The curious incident of the photo
that was accused of being false: Issues of domain specificity in
development, autism, and brain imaging. The Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology (Colchester.), 61, 76–89.
Pierno, A.C., Mari, M., Glover, S., Georgiou, I., & Castiello, U.
(2006). Failure to read motor intentions from gaze in children
with autism. Neuropsychologia, 44, 1483–1488.
Raznahan, A., Toro, R., Daly, E., Robertson, D., Murphy, C., et al.
(2010). Cortical anatomy in autism spectrum disorder: An in
vivo MRI study on the effect of age. Cereberal Cortex, 20,
1332–1340.
Rensink, R.A. (2002). Change detection. Annual Review of
Psychology, 53, 245–277.
Ro, T., Russell, C., & Lavie, N. (2001). Changing faces:
A detection advantage in the flicker paradigm. Psychological
Science, 12, 94–99.
Rump, K.M., Giovannelli, J.L., Minshew, N.J., & Strauss, M.S.
(2009). The development of emotion recognition in individuals with autism. Child Development, 80, 1434–1447.
Rutherford, M.D., & Krysko, K.M. (2008). Eye direction, not
movement direction, predicts attention shifts in those with
autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38, 1958–1965.
Rutherford, M.D., Pennington, B.F., & Rogers, S.J. (2006). The
perception of animacy in young children with autism. Journal
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36, 983–992.
Sasson, N.J. (2006). The development of face processing in
autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 36,
381–394.
Scherf, K.S., Luna, B., Kimchi, R., Minshew, N., & Behrmann, M.
(2008). Missing the big picture: Impaired development of
global shape processing in autism. Autism Research, 1,
114–129.
Scherf, K.S., Behrmann, M., Kimchi, R., & Luna, B. (2009).
Emergence of global shape processing continues through
adolescence. Child Development, 80, 162–177.
Scherf, K., Luna, B., Minshew, N., & Behrmann, M. (2010).
Atypical development of face-related activation in autism.
Frontiers in Neuroscience, Mar 22;4:26.

142

Shah, A., & Frith, U. (1983). An islet of ability in autistic
children: A research note. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 24, 613–620.
Shore, D., Burack, J.A., Miller, D., Joseph, S., & Enns, J.T. (2006).
The development of change detection. Developmental
Science, 9, 490–497.
Simons, D.J., & Levin, D.T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 1, 261–267.
Simons, D.J., & Rensink, R.A. (2005). Change blindness: Past,
present, and future. Trends Cogn Sci, 9, 16–20.
Simons, D.J., Franconeri, S.L., & Reimer, R.L. (2000). Change
blindness in the absence of a visual disruption. Perception,
29, 1143–1154.
Smith, H., & Milne, E. (2009). Reduced change blindness
suggests enhanced attention to detail in individuals with
autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50,
300–306.
Speer, L.L., Cook, A.E., McMahon, W.M., & Clark, E. (2007). Face
processing in children with autism: Effects of stimulus
contents and type. Autism, 11, 265–277.
Steele, S., Minshew, N., Luna, B., & Sweeney, J. (2007). Spatial
working memory deficits in autism. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 37, 605–612.
Tager-Flusberg, H., & Sullivan, K. (1994). A second look at
second-order belief attribution in autism. Journal of Autism
and Developmental Disorders, 24, 577–586.
Tuchman, R. (2003). Autism. Neurologic Clinics, 21, 915–932.
Wallace, S., Coleman, M., Pascalis, O., & Bailey, A. (2006).
A study of impaired judgment of eye-gaze direction and
related face-processing deficits in autism spectrum disorders.
Perception, 35, 1651–1664.
Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence.
San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation.
Williams, D.L., Goldstein, G., & Minshew, N. (2005). Impaired
memory for faces and social scenes in autism: Clinical
implications of memory dysfunction. Archives of Clinical
Neuropsychology, 20, 1–15.

O’Hearn et al./Impaired scene detection in ASD

INSAR

